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Abstract. This paper analyzes why certain epistemic adverbs are/are not embed-
dable under imperatives, by adopting Kaufmann’s (2012) modal analysis of imper-
atives and the assumption that epistemic modal bases are closed. The embeddable
adverb is a modal modifier (Anand & Brasoveanu 2009) that expands the quan-
tificational domain of the modal co-occurring with it, but the unembeddable one
is a pure epistemic modal whose semantics does not involve an ordering source as
in von Fintel & Gillies (2010). Imperative operators lose their contribution when
they scope over the latter type adverbs because of vacuous quantification, hence
violating a conversational principle proposed by Crnicˇ (2011). The account lends
support to the modal analysis of imperatives, which competes with Portner’s (2007)
To-Do Lists analysis.
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1. Introduction. This paper deals with an issue that has gone unnoticed in the literature: why
is a certain class of epistemic adverbs embeddable under imperatives, while another class is
not? Specifically, Japanese has two epistemic adverbs, zettaini ‘definitely’ and matigainaku 
‘certainly’.1 They convey an almost identical meaning when they occur in declaratives:
(1) Kare-wa
he-TOP
zettaini/matigainaku
definitely/certainly
isha-da.
doctor-COP
‘He is definitely/absolutely a doctor.’
In (1), both adverbs are interpreted as conveying epistemic modality. However, the two adverbs
differ when embedded under imperatives:
(2) Ringo-o
apple-ACC
zettaini/#matigainaku
definitely/#certainly
taber-o.
eat-IMP
‘Definitely/Certainly eat an apple!’
The zettaini-version is interpreted as posing a stronger command than the plain imperative
(i.e., zettaini strengthen the command offered by the speaker), while matigainaku is incom-
patible with imperatives in the first place. How can we derive this contrast?
Our argument is that we can capture the contrast if we adopt two assumptions available
in the market: the modal approach to imperatives (Kaufmann 2012) and the closedness of the
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University/JSPS Research Fellow (iharashun0@gmail.com).
1Matigainaku is in fact ambiguous between its epistemic interpretation exemplified in (1) and its decompositional
meaning, which roughly corresponds to ‘without making mistakes’. The latter interpretation comes from the fact that
matigainaku can be decomposed into matigai ‘mistake’ and naku ‘NEG’. We deal only with the former interpretation
throughout this paper.
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context set (i.e. the epistemic modal base) (Gillies 2010 and von Fintel & Gillies 2010). We
will propose that zettaini is a modal modifier as in Anand & Brasoveanu 2009 while mati-
gainaku is a pure epistemic modal without ordering sources. The imperative operator contains
the context set as its quantificational domain, and its contribution is lost when it scopes over
matigainaku-type adverbs because of the closedness, leading to violation of a conversational
principle proposed by Crnicˇ (2011).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces Kaufmann’s (2012)
modal analysis of imperatives. Section 3 discusses the validity of the closedness of the context
set. Section 4 gives observations and analyses on the semantics of zettaini and matigainaku.
Section 5 illustrates how the contrast in (2) is derived, and Section 6 is the conclusion with
an implication for the controversy between the modal approach to imperatives and the To-Do
Lists approach proposed by Portner (2007).
2. A modal view of imperatives. Imperatives have recently been argued to belong to modality
proper, in that a modal operator is responsible for their conventional link to directive speech
acts (Han 1998, Grosz 2009, Kaufmann 2012, Condoravdi & Lauer 2012, Medeiros 2013,
Ihara & Noguchi 2019, a.o.). Before we spell out the analysis in detail, in this section, we in-
troduce the framework that we adopt for the analysis, which is generally known as the “modal
theory” (or the “strong theory”) of imperatives developed by Kaufmann (2012).
Kaufmann’s theory relies on a version of Kratzer’s (1981) semantics for modality in pos-
sible worlds semantics. Kratzer employs conversational backgrounds, which are functions from
worlds to sets of propositions that describe what is known to an agent, what is desired by an
agent, what the law says, etc. Modal expressions can then be interpreted as quantifiers over the
sets of possible worlds compatible with such a background (i.e. the intersection of the set of
propositions that the conversational background assigns to the world of evaluation). She fur-
ther proposes to individuate the domain of quantification via two conversational backgrounds
that play different roles: one serves as the modal base (represented as ‘f ’) that records ‘what
is known’ or ‘what the relevant facts are’; the other one serves as the ordering source (rep-
resented as ‘g’) and determines which of the worlds compatible with these relevant facts are
more plausible, are morally better, realize more of an agent’s goals, etc. Technically, the or-
dering source induces an ordering on the set of possible worlds ‘⪯g(w)’ as in (3), which is
used to single out the highest ranked worlds among those compatible with the modal base:
‘BEST(f )(g)(w)’ are those worlds in
⋂
f (w) such that no other worlds in
⋂
f (w) are strictly bet-
ter than they are according to g(w), cf. (4).
(3) u ⪯g(w) v iff {p | p ∈
⋂
g(w) ∧ v ∈ p} ⊆ {p | p ∈ ⋂g(w) ∧ u ∈ p}
(4) BEST(f )(g)(w) = {w′ | ∀z ∈ ⋂f (w)[z ⪯g(w) w′ → w′ ⪯g(w) z)]}
By adopting Kratzer’s framework of modals, Kaufmann derives the meaning of imper-
atives from a modal layer in the semantics of imperatives, i.e., imperatives have almost the
same truth-condition as sentences with deontic modals like should or ought to, which allows
us to analyze imperatives on a par with deontic modals. She proposes that the relevant modal
base is what is known to the conversational participants, that is, the Common Ground (CG),
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whose intersection is the Context Set (CS), and that the ordering source is deontic.2 The fol-
lowing is a simplified denotation of Kaufmann’s imperative operator, where cA is the addressee
in the context of the utterance.3
(5) JOPimp K= λfλgλpλw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w)∩BEST(f )(g)(w) → p(w′)],
where f (w) = CG(w) = {p | p is known in w}, and g(w) = {p | p is is what is ordered to
cA in w}.
Let us briefly demonstrate how the meaning of imperatives is derived in Kaufmann’s account.
Consider (6) for example.
(6) Come to the party!JCome to the party! K = ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w)∩BEST(f )(g)(w) → cA comes to the party at w′].
The imperative (6) is true iff the addressee comes to the party at all worlds w in CS (that is,⋂
f (w′)), and ranked best in terms of what the addressee is ordered to do at w. More intu-
itively, (6) is true iff the speaker and the addressee know that it is possible that the addressee
comes to the party, and his/her coming to the party satisfies the greatest number of orders
posed on the addressee among alternatives actions such as the addressee playing soccer, the
addressee cleaning the room, etc.
We do not go into further details of her model due to limitations of space, but this line
of analysis, namely the ‘imperatives-as-modalized-propositions’ analysis, works well enough
to explain why epistemic adverbs like zettaini are embeddable in imperatives while ones like
matigainaku are not.
3. The closedness of the context set. This section briefly introduces the notion of closedness.
This is a property of the context set, which says that the set of epistemically accessible worlds
are constant among worlds contained in that set. Formally:
(7) If w′ ∈ CS(w), then CS(w′) = CS(w).
This property is assumed by several analyses of epistemic modals (von Fintel & Gillies (2010)
and Gillies (2010), to name a few), and can be derived from two other properties of the con-
text set that are more widely assumed in the modal literature (Kaufmann et al. 2006): realism
and negative introspection. The rest of this section sees the validity of these two properties and
how closedness is derived from them.
2Kaufmann expresses the meaning flexibility of imperatives (e.g. COMMAND, ADVISE, PERMISSION, etc.) by
assuming that the value of the ordering source g depends on contexts. Although we fix its value as COMMAND
throughout this paper, the explanation we will propose is also applicable to other values.
3Kaufmann proposes that the imperative operator enforces the following presuppositions: (i) temporal restric-
tion: an imperative is satisfied at or following utterance time, (ii) authority condition: the speaker is in an epistem-
ically privileged position with respect to the conversational backgrounds f and g, (iii) epistemic uncertainty: the
speaker believes that both p and ¬p are possible, and (iv) ordering source restriction: the ordering source g must
be prioritizing or speaker bouletic, in the sense of Portner (2007). The semantics introduced here also ignores several
complications and contains only notions relevant to the following discussion for the sake of simplicity, which makes
no difference in the following discussion. For the complete version, refer to Kaufmann (2012, Ch. 3–4).
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3.1 REALISM. If the set of worlds accessible from a world w is realistic, w is itself contained
in that set (in other words, the accessibility relation between w and its accessible worlds is re-
flexive). It is generally held that the context set, that is, the set of worlds compatible with the
knowledge of the speaker (or conversational participants), has this property. Thus, we have w
∈ CS(w). This property ensures that our world is the one where all known propositions are
true. Therefore know(p), which is assumed to be true at a world w if p is true in all worlds in
CS(w), entails the truth of p.
3.2 NEGATIVE INTROSPECTION. If a set of worlds accessible from a world w are negative
introspective, in other words, if the accessibility relation involved is euclidean, that set is a
subset of the set of worlds accessible from a world in that set. When CS(w) has this property,
we have CS(w) ⊆ CS(w′) for any w′ ∈ CS(w).
What if CS does not have this property? It allows the case where w′ ∈ CS(w), w′′ ∈ CS(w′),
and CS(w′) ⊈ CS(w′′), that is, some worlds in CS(w′) are not contained in CS(w′′). This means
that CS(w) can contain a p-world, which leads to p might be true, while all worlds in CS(w′)
are ¬p-worlds, which is equivalent to I know it is certain that p is true, on the assumption that
might(p) and it is certain(p) are true at w if there is a p-world in CS(w) and if all worlds in
CS(w) are p-worlds, respectively. Thus we predict the continuation p might be true but I know it
is certain that p is not true to be consistent, which is not.
3.3 CLOSEDNESS. The closednness is logically derived from realism and negative introspec-
tion. Following is the proof steps adapted from Gillies (2010: 7):
(8) For any w′ ∈ CS(w),
(i) Since w′ ∈ CS(w), we have CS(w) ⊆ CS(w′) [Negative introspection].
(ii) Since CS(w) ⊆ CS(w′) and w ∈ CS(w) [Realism], we have w ∈ CS(w′).
(iii) Since w ∈ CS(w′), we have CS(w′) ⊆ CS(w) [Euclidean].
(iv) Since CS(w) ⊆ CS(w′) and CS(w′) ⊆ CS(w), we have CS(w) = CS(w′).
Thus, for any w′ ∈ CS(w), CS(w) = CS(w′). Given that the two properties overviewed in the
two preceding subsections are necessary to capture the behavior of epistemic modality and
knowledge ascription like know, the closedness, which is a logical consequence of them, should
be maintained.
4. Semantics of zettaini and matigainaku. This section proposes the semantics for the two ad-
verbs zettaini and matigainaku. We analyze zettaini as a modal modifier (Anand & Brasoveanu
2009) which takes a modal as one of its arguments, and matigainaku as a pure epistemic modal
which accompanies no ordering sources as in von Fintel & Gillies (2010).
4.1 Zettaini AS A MODAL MODIFIER. Although we call zettaini as an epistemic adverb, its in-
terpretation is not strictly limited to the epistemic one. It concords with the modal with which
it is co-occurring and strengthens the modal claim. The following is one piece of evidence for
that:
(9) (At a pub, John is trying to order his and your drinks. He asks you “What do you want
to drink?” You say)
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a. Watashi-wa
I-TOP
zettaini
definitely
biiru-ga
beer-NOM
nomi-tai.
drink-want.to
‘I definitely want to drink beer.’
b. #Watashi-wa
I-TOP
biiru-ga
beer-NOM
nomi-tai
drink-want.to
nitigainai.
mustEPISTEMIC
‘I must want to drink beer.’
As in (9-b), the epistemic modal nitigainai ‘must’ is odd in this context because the speaker is
having direct experience of her current internal state (in this case, her internal desire to drink
beer), so does not have to make an inference about it. The felicity of (9-a) means that zettaini
is not offering epistemic modality in this case; it strengthens the bouletic statement made by
-tai ‘want.to’.
The modal flavor that zettaini can strengthen is not limited to the bouletic one; it goes also
with volitional modality:
(10) (Yesterday you said an inappropriate thing to a friend. You regret it and you now have
firm determination not to say such a thing. You say to yourself)
a. Watashi-wa
I-TOP
zettaini
definitely
nidoto
again
anna-koto-o
that-thing-ACC
iwa-nai.
say-NEG
‘I will definitely not say that thing again.’
b. #Watashi-wa
I-TOP
nidoto
again
anna-koto-o
that-thing-ACC
iwa-nai
say-NEG
nitigainai.
mustEPISTEMIC
‘I must not be going to say that thing again.’
(10-b) sounds odd for the same reason as in (9-b): the speaker need not infer what her current
volitional state is like, while zettaini concords with the volitional modality served by the pred-
icate yaru as in (9-a).4 These facts suggest that zettaini flexibly concords with a wide range of
modals.
We propose, in line with Anand & Brasoveanu (2009), that zettaini is a modal modifier
that takes a modal as one of its arguments. Anand & Brasoveanu deal with the fact that sen-
tences like (11) involve two modals, the adverb obligatorily and the auxiliary must, but convey
only one modal statement (the phenomenon known as modal concord), and argue that deontic
modal adverbs such as obligatorily and legitimately share their contextual backgrounds with
the modal co-occurring with them (the ordering source is abbreviated for the sake of simplic-
ity, and M is a variable over modals):
4In (9-a), one might find it unreasonable that the bare form yaru provides the volitional modality, and be tempted
to claim that the modality comes from zettaini. However, the following shows that the bare form provides volitional-
ity on its own in Japanese:
(i) (The same context as (10))
Watashi-wa
I-TOP
kyoo
today
yaru.
do
‘I will do it today.’
Therefore, we assume that Japanese bare forms serve as modals in some cases, and that (10) and (i) are examples
where it gives volitional modality.
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(11) John obligatorily must be home.
a. Structure:
[[[obligatorily must] f ] p]
b. Jmust K = λfλpλw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w) → p(w′)]J obligatorily K = λMλfλpλw: f is deontic. M(f )(p)(w) ∧ ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w) → p(w′)].
c. J (11) K = J obligatorily K(Jmust K)(f )(p)
= λw. Jmust K(f )(p)(w) ∧ ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w) → p(w′)].
= λw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w) → p(w′)] ∧ ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w) → p(w′)].
= λw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w) → p(w′)].
Thus (11), which contains two modals, ends up making one modal claim, resulting in the con-
cording effect. We will apply the same kind of analyses to zettaini.
In addition to multiple modals being interpreted as if there is only one modal, there is an-
other important observation around modal concord, which is the requirement that two modals
that enter into a concord relation must agree in their quantificational force. For example, (12-a)
sounds odd because must makes universal quantification, while the quantificational force of
legitimately is existential, as represented in (12-b).
(12) a. #John must legitimately deny your request.
b. J legitimately K = λMλfλpλw: f is deontic. ∃w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w) ∧ p(w′)].
c. Implicature of existentials: ¬∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w) → p(w′)].
(Anand & Brasoveanu 2009: 24)
Anando & Brasoveanu argue that the deviance is due to the incompatibility between the uni-
versal claim made by must and the implicature of the existential legitimately, the latter of which
requires that not all worlds in the quantificational domain are worlds where the prejacent is
true (non-universality implicature), as in (12-c). In (12-a), must requires all worlds in
⋂
f (w) to
be ones where John denies your request, which goes against the implicature of legitimately that
John does not do so in at least one world in
⋂
f (w). This inconsistency makes (12-a) deviant.
We have to add some twists to Anando & Brasoveanu’s (2009) analysis in order to capture
the semantics of zettaini properly. First, as has been mentioned, zettaini shows the strength-
ening effect, which is not achieved if zettaini just makes a universal quantification over the
same quantificational domain as the modal with which it co-occurs; (11-c) ends up asserting
the same thing as John must be home, so if zettaini shared the same semantics with obliga-
torily, we would not expect the strengthening effect. Second, the denotation of adverbs like
(11-b) only works when the modal auxiliary and adverb are clause-mates; otherwise, the two
modals could not share the same contextual backgrounds. However, zettaini concords with a
modal occurring in the clause embedding it:
(13) Kono
this
zyoohoo-o
information-ACC
zettaini
definitely
morasa-nai
leak-NEG
koto-ga
COMP-NOM
gimudukera-re-teiru.
oblige-PASS-PROG
‘It is obliged that you definitely should not leak this information.’
In (13), zettaini, which is located in the complement clause, concords with the modal gimudukera-
re-teiru ‘be obliged’, which occurs in the matrix clause. This case of concord cannot be cap-
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tured with the lexical entry presented in (11-b).
Taking these two points into consideration, we propose the following semantics for zettaini.5
(14) J zettaini Ka = λf 2λg2λpλMλw: [λfλg. JM Ka[ f1 → fg1 → g]](f 2)(g2) is defined.
∃S[⋂f 2(w)∩BEST(f 2)(g2)(w) ⊆ S ∧ ∀w′[w′ ∈ S ∈ → p(w′)]].
Zettaini takes its own modal base f 2 and ordering source g2. The pressupositional part of the
denotation abstracts over M’s modal base and ordering source and requires f 2 and g2 to fulfill
the presupposition of M, which in turn ensures that zettaini shares the same contextual back-
grounds with the original modal claim, as in Anando & Brasoveanu (2009). Zettaini further
introduces a set of worlds S that is a superset of the set of best-ranked worlds in terms of f 2
and g2, and requires a universal quantification to hold over the new quantificational domain.
The quantificational domain is larger than the ordinary modal claims, hence the strengthening
effect being obtained.
Let us illustrate the derivation of the meaning of (9-a) as an example. We assume the LF-
structure for (9-a) as in (15-a).
(15) a. LF for (9-a) J zettaini K(f 2)(g2)(p)(Jwant.to K(f 1)(g1))
J zettaini K(f 2)(g2)(p)
zettaini f 2
g2
p
I drink beer
Jwant.to K(f 1)(g1)
‘want.to’ f 1
g1
b. Jwant.to K(f 1)(g1) is defined only if f 1 is circumstantial and g1 is bouletic.
c. Presupposition of zettaini: [λfλg. Jwant.to Ka[ f1 → fg1 → g](f 1)(g1)](f 2)(g2) is defined.
= Jwant.to Ka(f 2)(g2) is defined.
= f 2 is circumstantial and g2 is bouletic.
d. J zettaini Ka(f 2)(g2)(p)(Jwant.to K(f 1)(g1)) is...
(i) defined only if f 2 is circumstantial and g2 is bouletic.
(ii) true iff ∃S[⋂f 2(w)∩BEST(f 2)(g2)(w) ⊆ S ∧ ∀w′[w′ ∈ S ∈ → I drink beer in
5Note that unlike Anando & Brasoveanu’s (2009) notation, we treat M as the variable over modals whose slots
for contextual backgrounds are already saturated.
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w′]].
The contextual backgrounds for the universal modal claim made by zettaini are of the same
kind as the original ‘want.to’-claim, which means that the resulting sentence (15-d) is a bouletic-
modal claim. Furthermore, the larger quantificational domain S makes the modal claim stronger.
Thus we can capture the correct meaning of zettaini-sentences with the semantics in (14).
Note that (14) is applicable to cases like (13), where zettaini and the modal it modifies are not
clause-mates; as is seen in (15-a), zettaini does not have to occur in the sister position of the
modal that is to be modified.6
Before proceeding to the discussion of matigainaku, let us address force-agreement. As in
English modal concord, zettaini shows incompatibility with possibility modals:7
(16) #John-wa
John-TOP
zettaini
definitely
isha
doctor
kamosirenai.
might
‘John definitely might be a doctor.’
We can derive this deviance in the same way as Anando & Brasoveanu (2009). Let us assume
that the possibility modal kamosirenai ‘might’ accompanies an implicature that the prejacent is
not true at some worlds in its quantificational domain. This is incompatible with the assertion
of zettaini, since it requires the prejacent John is a doctor to be true in all worlds in a superset
of kamosirenai’s quantificational domain.
4.2 Matigainaku AS A PURE EPISTEMIC MODAL. This subsection proposes that unlike zettaini,
the modal flavor of matigainaku is lexically determined to be epistemic, and that it does not
involve ordering source (von Fintel & Gillies 2010). The pure epistemicity of matigainaku is
seen in the following examples:
(17) a. (At a pub, John is trying to order his and your drinks. He asks you “What do you
want to drink?” You say)
#Watashi-wa
I-TOP
matigainaku
certainly
biiru-ga
beer-NOM
nomi-tai.
drink-want.to
‘I definitely want to drink beer.’
b. (Yesterday you said an inappropriate thing to a friend. You regret it and you now
have firm determination not to say such a thing. You say to yourself)
#Watashi-wa
I-TOP
matigainaku
certainly
nidoto
again
anna-koto-o
that-thing-ACC
iwa-nai.
say-NEG
‘I will certainly not say that thing again.’
Just as the epistemic auxiliary nitigainai is odd in these contexts, matigainaku also sounds
awkward. This correlation indicates that matigainaku cannot encode modal flavors other than
the epistemic one.
6As the reader may point out, we have to posit a covert epistemic modal in order to derive the epistemic reading
of the zettaini-sentence in (1). This assumption is not unreasonable given that Japanese bare forms provide modality
in some cases as we saw in footnote 4, and this problem is not specific to ours: how to deal with the cases where a
concord adverb accompanies no modal but modality is detected is a challenge for any analyses in which concord
adverbs do not have their own modal component.
7We thank Uli Sauerland (p.c.) for bringing out this point.
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Let us move onto the lack of ordering sources. It is generally assumed that epistemic ne-
cessity modals without ordering sources encode the speaker’s maximal certainty of the truth
of the prejacent, because the presence of ordering sources narrows down the context set, the
quantificational domain for epistemic modals, to a subset of it. English must, von Fintel &
Gillies (2010) argue, encodes the maximal certainty and does not have ordering sources ac-
cordingly. The oddness of the following discourse is one of the observations supporting this
claim:
(18) A: It must be raining.
B: [Opens curtains] No it isn’t. You were wrong.
A: #I was not! Look, I didn’t say it WAS raining. I only said it MUST be raining.
Stop picking on me! (von Fintel & Gillies 2010: (19))
The deviance of A’s reply indicates that she cannot avoid the blame because she has maxi-
mally committed herself to the truth of it is raining in her first utterance. Replacing must with
a weaker modal like might improves the acceptability:
(19) A: It might be raining.
B: [Opens curtains] No it isn’t. You were wrong.
A: I was not! Look, I didn’t say it WAS raining. I only said it MIGHT be raining.
Stop picking on me! (ibid.: (17))
The fact that the discourse sounds consistent with a weaker modal underpins the claim that the
maximal certainty is at play in (18).
The same pattern holds for matigainaku and other weaker epistemic adverbs:
(20) A: Ame-ga
rain-NOM
matigainaku
certainly
futteiru.
falling
‘It is certainly raining.’
B: [Opens curtains] Futtei-nai.
falling-NEG
Kimi-wa
you-TOP
matigatteiru.
wrong
‘It is not raining. You are wrong.’
A: #Watasi-wa
I-TOP
matigainaku
certainly
futteiru-to
falling-COMP
itta
said
dake-da.
only-COP.
Futteiru-to-wa
falling-COMP-TOP
ittei-nai.
said-NEG.
‘I only said it was certainly raining. I didn’t say it was raining.’
The use of a weaker adverbs like osoraku ‘probably’ rescues the discourse:
(21) A: Ame-ga
rain-NOM
osoraku
probably
futteiru.
falling
‘It is probably raining.’
B: [Opens curtains] Futtei-nai.
falling-NEG
Kimi-wa
you-TOP
matigatteiru.
wrong
‘It is not raining. You are wrong.’
A: Watasi-wa
I-TOP
osoraku
probably
futteiru-to
falling-COMP
itta
said
dake-da.
only-COP.
Futteiru-to-wa
falling-COMP-TOP
ittei-nai.
said-NEG.
‘I only said it was probably raining. I didn’t say it was raining.’
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We see from these data that matigainaku encodes the speaker’s maximal certainty like English
must, so we can safely conclude that no ordering source is involved in its denotation. Thus we
propose that (22) is the semantics of matigainaku, which is a traditional epistemic necessity
modal:8
(22) Jmatigainaku K = λpλw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ CS(w) → p(w′)].
Before closing the section, comments on Lassiter (2016) are in order. Lassiter (2016) crit-
icizes von Fintel & Gillies (2010) and argues that must does not encode the maximal certainty.
One of his counter arguments is that modals that are strong enough, such as 99.9% certain, are
infelicitous in the same context as (18):
(23) A: It’s 99.9% certain that it’s raining.
B: [Opens curtains] No it isn’t. You were wrong.
A:??I was not! Look, I didn’t say it WAS raining. I only said it was 99.9% CERTAIN
that it was. Stop picking on me! (Lassiter 2016: (55))
What this example indicates is that an epistemic modal does not have to be maximally strong
to resist this context, which invalidates the claim that the oddness of (18) is evidence for must
having the maximal certainty.
However, Lassiter’s counterargument does not impair the validity of our proposal on mati-
gainaku for several reasons. First, von Fintel & Gillies (2018) are not fully certain about the
oddness of (23), and they mention that setting an appropriate dialogue makes (23) sound fine:
(24) A: It’s 99% certain that it’s raining.
B: [Opens curtains] No it isn’t. You were wrong.
A: Well, strictly speaking, I was not wrong. I was careful. I only said it was 99% cer-
tain that it was raining. (von Fintel & Gillies 2018: (10))
Second, in Japanese, modals like 99.9% certain sounds felicitous in the same context as (18)
without the modification done by von Fintel & Gillies (2018):
(25) A: Ame-ga
rain-NOM
99.9-paasento
99.9-percent
futteiru.
falling
8As von Fintel & Gillies (2010) and Matthewson (2015) argue, English must can only be used when the speaker’s
evidence is indirect, i.e., the utterance it must be raining is infelicitous if the speaker is directly seeing rain. The
same observation goes for matigainaku:
(i) (Seeing falling raindrops)
#Ame-ga
rain-NOM
matigainaku
certainly
futteiru.
falling
‘It is certainly raining.’
In order to exclude examples like this, we have only to add the indirectness presupposition to (22) like the following:
(ii) Jmatigainaku K = λpλw: p, ¬p /∈ CG(w). ∀w′[w′ ∈ CS(w)→ p(w′)].
The presupposition, which is adapted from von Fintel & Gillies (2010), requires CG(w) to contain neither p nor ¬p
as one of its members, that is, the participants to know neither that p is true or that p is false. This amounts to say-
ing that the participants do not know the truth of p directly. This indirectness presupposition is not relevant to the
discussion to come, so we will omit this part for the sake of simplicity.
10
‘It is raining with 99.9% probability.’
B: [Opens curtains] Futtei-nai.
falling-NEG
Kimi-wa
you-TOP
matigatteiru.
wrong
‘It is not raining. You are wrong.’
A: Watasi-wa
I-TOP
99.9-paasento
99.9-percent
futteiru-to
falling-COMP
itta
said
dake-da.
only-COP.
Futteiru-to-wa
falling-COMP-TOP
ittei-nai.
said-NEG.
‘I only said it was raining with 99.9% probability. I didn’t say it was raining.’
99.9-paasento, which is quite strong but not maximal, can be used in this discourse while
matigainaku is not, which clearly supports the argument that matigainaku is maximally strong.
Third, Lassiter focuses only on the English auxiliary must, and he observes with an experi-
ment that the English adverb certainly is stronger than must. Matigainaku is an adverb akin to
certainly, so even if his argument on must is correct, it does not immediately follow that mati-
gainaku’s strength is also non-maximal.
5. Illustration. We are now ready to illustrate how the contrast between two adverbs in (2).
The meaning of the zettaini-case, repeated here as (26-a), is derived in almost the same way as
(15), where zettani modifies the bouletic modal -tai:
(26) a. Ringo-o
apple-ACC
zettaini
definitely
taber-o.
eat-IMP
‘Definitely eat an apple!’
b. LF for (26-a) J zettaini K(f 2)(g2)(p)(JOPImp K(f 1)(g1))
J zettaini K(f 2)(g2)(p)
zettaini f 2
g2
p
cA eats an apple
Jwant.to K(f 1)(g1)
OPImp f 1
g1
c. JOPImp K(f 1)(g1) is defined only if f 1 is CG and g1 is deontic.
d. Presupposition of zettaini: [λfλg. JOPImp Ka[ f1 → fg1 → g](f 1)(g1)](f 2)(g2) is defined.
= JOPImp Ka(f 2)(g2) is defined.
= f 2 is CG and g2 is deontic.
e. J zettaini Ka(f 2)(g2)(p)(JOPImp K(f 1)(g1)) is...
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(i) defined only if f 2 is CG and g2 is deontic.
(ii) true iff ∃S[⋂f 2(w)∩BEST(f 2)(g2)(w) ⊆ S ∧ ∀w′[w′ ∈ S ∈ → cA eats an apple
in w′]].
As in (15), the result is stronger than the plain imperative, because of the larger quantifica-
tional domain S.
Let us turn to the matigainaku-case, repeated here as (27-a). We assume the structure
(27-b) for the LF of (27-a), and the truth-condition will be computed as in (27-c):
(27) a. Ringo-o
apple-ACC
matigainaku
certainly
taber-o.
eat-IMP
‘Certainly eat an apple.’
b. LF for (27-a)JOPimp K(f 1)(g1)(Jmatigainaku K(p))
Jmatigainaku K(p)
matigainaku p
cA eats an apple
JOPimp K(f 1)(g1)
OPimp f 1
g1
c. JOPimp K(f 1)(g1)(Jmatigainaku K(p))
= ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂f (w)∩BEST(f )(g)(w) → ∀w′′[w′′ ∈ CS(w′) → cA eats an apple in w′′]]
= ∀w′[w′ ∈ CS(w)∩BEST(f )(g)(w) → ∀w′′[w′′ ∈ CS(w′) → cA eats an apple in w′′]]
(f (w) is CG(w), so
⋂
f (w) = CS(w))
= ∀w′[w′ ∈ CS(w)∩BEST(f )(g)(w) → ∀w′′[w′′ ∈ CS(w) → cA eats an apple in w′′]]
(Closedness: since w′ ∈ CS(w), CS(w) = CS(w′))
= ∀w′′[w′′ ∈ CS(w) → cA eats an apple in w′′]. (Vacuous quantification)
The two context sets involved in the formula, CS(w) and CS(w′), end up being identical be-
cause of the closedness discussed in Section 3, which makes the quantification by OPImp vacu-
ous, since the variable w′, which is bound by the OPImp’s universal quantifier, does not appear
in the second universal quantification done by matigainaku. As a result, the contribution of
OPImp is lost (that is, JOPImp K(f 1)(g2)(Jmatigainaku K(p)) = Jmatigainaku K(p)), which violates
the following principle:
(28) The principle of non-vacuity (Crnicˇ 2011: 110)
The meaning of a lexical item used in the discourse must affect the meaning of its host
sentence (either its truth-conditions or its presuppositions).
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Adding OPImp to matigainaku(p) makes no semantic difference because the closedness leads to
vacuous quantification, hence being susceptible to (28).
6. Conclusion and implication. This paper has given an account of why certain epistemic
adverbs in Japanese can/cannot be embedded under imperatives. We have argued that the em-
beddable adverb is a modal modifier that expands the quantificational domain of the modal
co-occurring with it, whereas the unembeddable one is a pure epistemic modal that ends up
causing vacuous quantification and nullifies the contribution of imperative operators.
The rest of this paper shows that only the modal (or strong) theory for imperatives can
capture a parallelism between imperatives and modals. As we have shown so far, the current
analysis relies on a rich denotational semantics of imperatives proposed by Kaufmann (2012),
according to which imperatives denote modalized propositions. As is well known in the re-
cent studies of imperatives, however, there is a competing view proposed by Portner (2007)
(See also von Fintel & Iatridou (2017)). Portner, following Hausser (1980), rather proposes the
‘minimal’ denotational semantics, namely the ‘non-modal’ semantics, according to which im-
peratives denote a property (rather than a proposition) that is restricted to the addressee (as in
(29)), and update a context by adding the property to the discourse component called the To-
Do Lists (TDLs): for every individual, the TDL contains a list of properties that the individual
should make true of themselves. For Portner, then, the heavy lifting of imperatives is done in
the pragmatics: the meaning of ‘necessity’ that we associate with imperatives is not encoded in
the syntax-semantics but is part of the relevant discourse component.
(29) JCome to the party Kc= λwλx: x = cA. x comes to the party at w
Consider now the data in (30), repeated from (13), where matigainaku and zettaini are
embedded under the deontic modal gimudukera-re-teiru ‘(be) obliged.’ Interestingly, as in the
case of imperatives, matigainaku cannot be embedded under the modal while zettaini is felici-
tous.
(30) Kono
this
zyoohoo-o
information-ACC
zettaini/#matigainaku
definitely/certainly
morasa-nai-koto-ga
leak-NEG-COMP-NOM
gimudukera-re-teiru.
oblige-PASS-PROG
‘It is obliged that you should definitely not leak this information.’
The fact that both imperatives and performative modals can embed zettaini but cannot mati-
gainaku constitutes a problem for any analysis of imperatives that assigns them no modals.
For Portner’s minimal semantics, it is difficult to capture this parallelism between imperatives
and performative modals that we have shown above, because performative modals clearly de-
note a proposition rather than a property (and thus cannot update the TDL). It is worth noting
that it is not the case that Portner’s account of imperatives is ‘modality-free;’ he claims that
the modality exists as ‘meta-modality,’ but just not in the syntax and semantics (the particu-
lar meta-modality involved in the TDL in a theory of context is explored in detail in Portner
(2007)). We stress, however, that it is still unclear how certain epistemic adverbs like mati-
gainaku and zettaini interact with imperatives within the theory of minimal semantics; the the-
ory needs to be extended or at least say more about what the character of modality involved in
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the TDL is.9
On the other hand, the same explanation as in the case of imperatives can be applied to
(30), which lends support for the modal view of imperatives; in (30), while zettaini can strengthen
the modal claim made by the deontic modal ‘it is obliged’ thanks to its flexibility, matigainaku
violates the non-vacuity principle since the deontic modal embedding matigainaku cannot
make any contribution due to vacuous quantification.
Although the present analysis supports the modal view, it does not immediately mean that
we should completely reject the minimal approach. Instead, we are claiming that at least in
some language, especially in Japanese, the modal approach is clearly needed. One possibil-
ity might be whether or not imperatives contain modals depends on language-specific mor-
phological systems (cf. Medeiros 2013); that is, for instance, imperatives in Japanese may en-
code modals whereas in English, imperatives may denote no modality. We should thus verify
whether the account in this paper can be applied to imperatives in other languages, which will
be left to future research. Moreover, examining a compatibility between ‘non-canonical’ form
imperatives (See von Fintel & Iatridou (2017) for Hebrew and German. See Ihara & Noguchi
(2019) for Japanese) and epistemic adverbs also needs to be implemented.
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